

Guidelines for OSCE Staff

Supporting Governance- Driven Approaches to Building Integrity in the Security Sector



Executive Summary

This chapter provides OSCE staff with advice on how to promote governance-driven and cross-dimensional support to building integrity within the security sector, as a key component of good governance. The chapter explains the rationale behind the need to uphold the security sector to high standards of ethical values (section 1); underlines the importance of strengthening cross-dimensional aspects of integrity-building efforts (section 2); outlines the main guiding approaches to ensure that support in this area remains governance-driven (section 3); and identifies key entry points for programmatic support (section 4). Finally, a practical checklist is provided to help staff in the process (section 5).

Key points from the chapter:

- **The security sector must uphold the same high standards of ethical values in the pursuit of their mandate as any other public sector:** The promotion of integrity is particularly important within the security sector, as the only component of the public sector that embodies the legitimate use of force and limitation of civil liberties.
- **Integrity-building projects and programmes should be governance-driven:** A strong culture of integrity supports security institutions in (a) effectively delivering security to all the population, (b) building a trust-relationship with its citizens and (c) promoting accountability to shared ethical values and principles, including the respect for human rights and gender equality. To achieve this effect, however, it is not sufficient to focus on narrow aspects of capacity-building. While this may be important, a culture of integrity requires governance-driven approaches that can support the integration of shared ethical values into the foundations of the institution. Such approaches may include fostering inclusivity, prioritizing support through an institutional-building lens, and promoting a focus on both internal accountability and external oversight.
- **Support to building integrity requires co-ordinated and coherent support across all OSCE dimensions:** While activities aimed at building the integrity of public institutions are mainly in the remit of the OSCE's second dimension, support to strengthening the good governance of security sector institutions has traditionally been led by the first dimension. At the same time, the third dimension also plays a key role in strengthening external oversight of the security sector, and mainstreaming human rights and gender approaches. These are all key building blocks for promoting integrity. The lack of clarity on which dimension should lead on integrity-building efforts in the security sector has meant that support in this area has sometimes fallen through the cracks. Efforts should be made to identify synergies and build on the extensive experience that all three OSCE dimensions have acquired in this field.

- **To plan for comprehensive support to integrity building, entry points should be considered at multiple levels:** OSCE support should always be grounded in an assessment of integrity-building needs prior to planning and designing specific projects. While the scope of the project will largely depend on the mandate and the available human and financial resources, efforts should be made to seek entry points at different levels. This may include strengthening legal and policy frameworks, promoting integrity at the institutional and individual levels, and/or supporting external oversight. For instance, while policy frameworks are key to ensure national commitment to integrity, they will only be an asset if they are effectively implemented. Similarly, while building individual capacity to integrity is fundamental, it will not produce long-term results without the necessary accompanying institutional reforms aiming at establishing clear and transparent human and financial management processes.



1. Rationale

Integrity provides an important barrier to corruption and lack of good governance, both recognized by the OSCE Ministerial Council as “*potential sources of political tension that undermine the stability and security of participating States.*”¹ Institutions, which are not perceived to uphold high standards of integrity and professionalism, are not only more likely to lose public trust but also to be ineffective in the delivery of services. Integrity building is therefore key to strengthening democratic institutions that uphold the rule of law and respect human rights and gender equality, and can contribute to preventing conflict and fostering security and development.²

Integrity is of particular importance to security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) as the security sector is the only public sector holding the legitimate authority to use violence. As security sector institutions also may limit civil liberties (e.g., when making arrests), it is paramount to demonstrate their commitment to the delivery of security for all people.

The integrity of the security sector, just as in any other public sector, refers to “the consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritizing the public interest over private interests in the sector.”³

The most common integrity violations are abuse of power and corruption (e.g., bribery, illicit enrichment, abuse of functions), as well as *policy capture*, whereby policies are repeatedly directed away from the public interest through legitimate means but towards a specific interest, exacerbating inequalities and undermining democratic values.⁴ Similarly, the cases of highly politicized security sectors, which are often at the service and protection of certain political elites, are also a consequence of low levels of integrity.

Therefore, while the security sector needs to be able to investigate and fight corruption, building integrity is much broader than tackling corruption. While the ethical values to be promoted are likely to depend on local standards and wider political realities, a common trend is the

1 See for instance, OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/16 on Strengthening Good Governance and Promoting Connectivity* (Hamburg, 2016), MC.DEC/4/16.

2 For instance, OSCE, *Ministerial Council Declaration on Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism* (Dublin, 2012), MC.DOC/2/12, recognizes that a public sector that is “based on integrity,” among others, is “a major factor of sustainable economic growth and contributes to fostering citizen’s trust in public institutions and government.”

3 OECD, *OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity* (Paris, 2017), p. 7.

4 For more information see OECD, *Preventing Policy Capture: Integrity in Public Decision Making* (Paris, 2017).

need to ensure that integrity transpires at both the individual and institutional levels and is reinforced by strong mechanisms for internal accountability and external oversight. As such, efforts to build integrity should be underpinned by the same principles of good governance that are applied to the public sector.⁵


Integrity building in the security sector is not new and is key to supporting nationally-driven SSG/R processes. The OSCE has successfully been providing assistance in this area to its participating States in the form of, among others, tailor-made seminars and conferences, trainings, and technical advice to support the enactment of laws and regulations foreseeing punitive measures for those who engage in corrupt activities. To effectively prevent illicit practices, a long-term and governance-driven approach that promotes an institutional culture of integrity across the security apparatus is needed. Building integrity should thus become a vital component of cross-dimensional and good-governance initiatives and be at the heart of any SSG/R approach.

Several tools within and beyond the OSCE have been developed to provide practical guidelines to support integrity building in the public sector, often in the framework of anti-corruption efforts.⁶ However, when it comes to the security sector, guidance is often limited only to a specific component of the sector (e.g., police). Moreover, there is no guidance on cross-dimensional and governance-driven approaches to addressing integrity building in the security sector that is in line with the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security.

5 See the section 2.2 in the chapter “[Understanding SSG/R in the OSCE Context](#)”.

6 E.g., OSCE, *Handbook on Combating Corruption* (Vienna, 2016).

Figure 1: OSCE commitments underlining the importance of promoting integrity in the public sector



2. Strengthening Cross-Dimensional Approaches to Integrity Building in the Security Sector

While integrity building in the security sector is recognized to be of vital importance to broader SSG/R efforts, OSCE support to this area has sometimes fallen through the cracks. Part of the challenge relates to the lack of a clear institutional anchor for this portfolio: the security sector is not considered at the core of the second dimension's mandate, and integrity building is not perceived as the primary domain of the first dimension. To ensure effective OSCE support, there is a need for stronger cross-dimensional approaches to identifying integrity-building needs and to acting on these. Such cross-dimensional approaches can build on the comparative advantages of each OSCE dimension, which can bring different expertise to the table. For instance:

- Under the **first dimension**, several field operations have sought to engage in integrity building, with a particular focus on policing and border management (e.g., training activities for border and customs officials and regional conferences to share experiences and lessons learned on building police integrity and accountability). Occasionally, the OSCE has supported programmes aimed at building accountability of specific security institutions in a comprehensive manner (including areas such as parliamentary oversight, external and internal oversight mechanisms, training, community consultations, and media support), which set the foundations for building integrity. However, the first dimension's efforts to date have often been focused on specific parts of the security sector, driven by the perception that integrity building within the security sector as a whole is a matter for the second dimension, just like for the other parts of the public sector.
- The **second dimension** has developed significant experience in supporting the development of anti-corruption strategies, sound and transparent public procurement processes, and regulations on whistle-blower protection, as well as in promoting integrity in the public sector. However, except for very few exceptions (see case study 1), the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) has not been involved in activities related to integrity building in the security sector per se. It has, however, engaged in building the capacity of the security sector, and in particular, investigators and prosecutors in investigating corruption and money laundering. Efforts have also been made to support the adoption and implementation of existing instruments, standards and norms (e.g., the World Customs Organization's Revised Arusha Declaration on Good Governance and Integrity in Customs Services).

Case Study 1



Strengthening Integrity through Assistance to Anti-corruption Institution Building in Armenia

In 2018, based on the request of the Ministry of Justice of Armenia, the OCEEA launched the extra-budgetary project “*Strengthening anti-corruption reform in Armenia*” aimed at establishing and reinforcing national anti-corruption institutions with adequate human and technical resources to foster the country’s good governance reforms, including in the security sector.

The project was the outcome of negotiations among different stakeholders, including the law enforcement institutions which were initially reluctant to engage. At the end, it was decided to create two institutions: I) a Corruption Prevention Commission (established in 2019) to prevent corruption through seeking compliance with ethical requirements, conflicts of interest and other restrictions for public officials and civil servants, implementation of asset and income declaration systems, and raising public awareness; and II) an Anti-Corruption Committee (established in 2021) to combat bribery and other corrupt practices in law-enforcement agencies. The project was jointly drafted by both the OSCE and the Ministry and focused on targeted policy, expert, advocacy, and capacity-building assistance in establishing the aforementioned anti-corruption institutions. For the first time, the OCEEA prominently engaged in the institutional development of specific anti-corruption institutions, from the development of organigrams and jobs descriptions to the design of recruitment processes for leadership positions and the provision of training to new staff. Moreover, in parallel, the OCEEA was also involved in drafting the Anti-Corruption Strategy and its Action Plan for 2019–2022, which was adopted by the Government in October 2019.

- The **third dimension** has also made an important contribution to building a culture of integrity within the security sector, working mainly on building external accountability (e.g., through supporting ombuds institutions and other independent oversight bodies, building civil society’s oversight capacities, as well as strengthening security sector institutions’ compliance with the rule of law and mainstreaming human rights and gender equality).⁷ Support has also been provided to enhance judicial integrity and to develop effective and transparent mechanisms to prosecute corruption. Ultimately, integrity is a cornerstone for the promotion of democratic and accountable institutions, which is at the core of the third dimension’s mandate.

⁷ OSCE, *The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R): Report by the Secretary General of the OSCE* (Vienna, 2019), SEC.GAL/42/19.

Case Study 2



A Cross-dimensional Working Group on Anti-corruption and Integrity Building in North Macedonia

In 2017, the OSCE Mission to Skopje established a cross-dimensional working group to co-ordinate the Mission's anti-corruption activities. The working group has allowed for exchange of information and a more co-ordinated and coherent support to national security and public sector actors: police, public prosecutor's office, State Commission for Prevention of Corruption, local self-government units, etc. As part of this support, the Mission has so far contributed to the development of a new Integrity Policy Declaration for local self-government units and trained the newly appointed integrity officers in 27 municipalities in 2021. In addition, the Mission supported the establishment of the anti-corruption legal clinic at the Faculty of Law in Skopje; assisted the Academy of Judges and Public Prosecutors in the development of judicial and prosecutorial ethics and ethical behaviour; provided advanced training in financial investigations, anti-corruption and assets recovery for the police; and supported the enhancement of anti-corruption capabilities for fighting border-related crimes. The Mission also continuously monitors the court proceedings of high-profile corruption cases.

All dimensions thus have extensive experience and interest in building integrity in different parts of the security sector and from different perspectives. Bearing this in mind, more efforts should be made to identify synergies across all three dimensions to promote organization-wide coherent approaches to integrity building. For example, it is undesirable to advance in strengthening the integrity of the public sector without including the security sector. Similarly, it is not sustainable to strengthen individual integrity through training offered by the first dimension if there are no parallel efforts to strengthen external accountability, which is an area often supported by the third dimension. Cross-dimensional approaches are therefore necessary and can be fostered by, among others, recognizing that broad governance projects for the public sector that focus on integrity building should also be rolled out to the security sector. Alternatively, smaller projects on human resource management or financial management in the security sector may offer an important entry point for engaging in SSG/R through an integrity building lens.⁸

8 For more examples on cross-dimensional co-operation, see the chapter “Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R”.

3. Guiding Approaches for Governance-Driven Support to Integrity Building in the Security Sector

The OSCE has acquired significant experience in providing training, developing codes of conduct, enacting laws and policies, and supporting investigative measures, all key anti-corruption initiatives. However, when it comes to building a culture of integrity, a shared understanding of the purpose and values guiding the institution, as well as conditions necessary to create commitment to those values, should be built. To that end, governance-driven approaches are important (i.e., the application of a good governance lens to any of the work provided by the OSCE in this field).⁹ When it comes specifically to developing integrity-building programmes, those should be guided, to the extent possible, by the following approaches:

- **Foster inclusive processes when developing, implementing and overseeing integrity-building programmes:** As in all efforts to support the consolidation of democratic institutions, integrity-building programmes or programmes with an integrity component should look beyond the government and be developed in consultation with not only the security sector institution concerned but also civil society (including women's groups and the youth), relevant parliamentary groups and other relevant actors. Taking an inclusive approach will not only foster a common understanding of the challenges and possible solutions, and ensure that programmes are fit-for-purpose, but it will also improve the public perception and increase citizens' trust in the security sector.¹⁰ Therefore, these actors should be involved at all stages of the project cycle to the extent possible. Opportunities should be created for relevant actors to provide input during the design of integrity-building programmes, as well as when overseeing its implementation, conducting monitoring or doing evaluation.

9 See the section 2.2 in the chapter [“Understanding SSG/R in the OSCE Context”](#).

10 A substantial body of evidence demonstrates that there is a significant negative correlation between integrity and, more specifically, corruption, as well as the levels of confidence in public institutions. See e.g., Anderson, C. J. & Tverdova, Y.V., “Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(1), 2003, pp. 91–109; or Clausen, B., Kraay, A., & Nyiri, Z., “Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions: Evidence from a Global Survey,” *The World Bank Economic Review*, 25(2), 2011, pp. 212–249.

Case Study 3



Inclusive Approaches to the Drafting of Regulation in Kosovo¹¹

In 2020, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo was invited to provide expert support through its Department for Security and Public Safety to a working group consisting of representatives of Kosovo Police, Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, and relevant civil society organizations established to review a draft regulation on integrity for police. The Mission's role was, *inter alia*, to ensure that the regulation reflects best international practices in the area of police integrity and is compatible with human rights principles. From March to November 2020, a series of working group meetings were organized to discuss, co-ordinate and compile suggestions and recommendations in the area of police integrity and conflict of interest by all representatives involved in the process. The diversity of opinions and substantive and technical expertise within the working group ensured a holistic approach to reviewing the document and contributed to its consistency and comprehensiveness. The Mission also provided a range of international perspectives on police integrity and prevention of the conflict of interest that were fed into the process.

- **Prioritize support through an institution-building lens:** Without establishing or changing necessary institutional processes and mechanisms, training individuals will not suffice, despite the fact that it is vital to foster change in knowledge and mindset. Integrity should thus be tackled from an institutional perspective and aim at decreasing incentives and opportunities for engaging in corruption and other undesirable practices. This should focus on organizational integrity by establishing clear and transparent human resources and financial management processes and creating decent working conditions for the police, military and other security actors with respect for gender equality and human rights. For institutional approaches to succeed, enough time should be planned to enable changes in behavior of staff that, in turn, will impact institutional practices and processes. Despite the OSCE's annual budget cycle and rotation of international staff, which may both challenge long-term commitment, multi-year programmes can be planned for. Such programmes could be designed and broken down into individual one-year projects that are grounded in long-term strategic plans aiming at producing outcomes and objectives.

11 All references to Kosovo – whether to the territory, institutions or population in this text – should be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council resolution 1244.

- **Promote a focus on both internal accountability and external oversight:** Integrity-building programmes in the security sector should strive to meet the same ethical standards of integrity as any other public institution. These values should be upheld through mechanisms of internal accountability which outline clearly what behavior is expected and how inappropriate behaviors sanctioned. At the same time, external oversight mechanisms are fundamental to ensure accountability at all levels of the security sector, including at the management level. External oversight mechanisms include state and non-state actors and institutions engaged in the democratic governance of the security sector (e.g., parliamentary committees, judicial services, anti-corruption agencies, independent complaint authorities, civil society, the media, etc.).



Info Box 1



Challenges in Implementing Governance-Driven Approaches to Integrity Building

Challenge	Entry points for action
Long-term national commitment might be lacking. Given the inherent sensitivities surrounding the fight against corruption and, more broadly, any integrity-building efforts, long-term national ownership and leadership is a necessary condition for success.	Long-term commitment can be promoted and planned for: ▸ Strong national leadership should be sought from the beginning.¹² ▸ Codes of conduct and other existing tools can be used as entry points to start the conversation. ▸ It is encouraged to sign MoUs with national counterparts. ▸ Key political momentums (e.g., post-elections) can be used to promote change.
The highest political structures might not comply with minimum standards of integrity. In many contexts, those same actors who are expected to introduce anti-corruption and integrity policies fail to operate in accordance with minimum standards of integrity.	Integrity-building efforts should go hand-in-hand with initiatives aiming at promoting minimum standards of integrity at the highest levels of the government: ▸ Relevant OSCE Decisions¹³ can be used as entry points for engaging in broader discussions with national counterparts on integrity building in the public sector.
Resistance might be faced within security sector institutions. Strengthening the integrity of any part of the public sector, especially the security sector, means reducing or re-balancing the influence of certain power groups over the sector. Those who stand to gain from corruption will lose when the possibilities for corruption are reduced.	The resistance that integrity reforms and initiatives might face should be identified as early as possible: ▸ When designing and planning for this kind of work, the political economy¹⁴ of the specific context should be assessed, and power dynamics need to be taken into account.

12 See the section 3.6 in the chapter “Results-Oriented Programming in the Field of SSG/R”.


13 See the Figure 1 above.

14 See the section 3.3 in the chapter “Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R”.

4. Key Entry Points for Supporting Integrity Building in the Security Sector

To put the aforementioned governance-driven approaches into practice, this section provides examples of the most common entry points to support participating States in building integrity within security institutions.

Figure 2: Entry points for integrity building in the security sector



4.1 Assessing Integrity-Building Needs

Tailor-made integrity-building initiatives should take into account the specific challenges, risks, needs and opportunities in building the integrity of the security sector in a given context. The cultural and political context in which these institutions operate should be taken into considerations for all programmatic interventions. To ensure this is the case, when planning for support to integrity building, OSCE staff could:

- **Introduce integrity aspects in (broader) SSG/R needs assessments:** If SSG/R assessments are intended to examine the extent to which security sector institutions function in accordance with democratic norms and good governance principles, then assessing the status of integrity of the institutions can provide an important contribution to the overall exercise. These broader assessments should serve to identify whether integrity building is a key issue that requires programmatic support or not.¹⁵
- **Conduct an in-depth assessment of integrity building as a basis for developing a project:** If integrity building has been identified as a key area for action, an in-depth assessment should be supported to identify specific needs and entry points. This requires gathering information on the applicable international and regional minimum standards, as well as on what constitutes low and high-levels of corruption in a given country and what are the perceptions by the local population.¹⁶ Periodic surveys of public opinion, which can inform assessments, may shed light on perceptions of corruption. Similarly, some local and international NGOs regularly gather and publish data and statistics relevant for integrity (e.g., the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International). However, it should be recognised that access to data (or simply, availability of data) may be very limited due to the sensitivities on this issue. For this reason, it is vital to have the support of national counterparts in the conduct of such assessments, or ideally, to support them in conducting a self-assessment.

15 For further information, see the chapter “Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R”.


16 United States Institute of Peace, *Fighting Corruption in Security Sector Reform* (Washington, D.C., 2010).

Info Box 2



Relevant Counterparts for Assessing Integrity Needs in the Security Sector

The specific stakeholders to be engaged will depend on the context, the scope and the objective of the programme. However, there are a number of actors, beyond the traditional security sector-related structures, which should be considered.



Case Study 4



Public Perception Surveys on Attitudes towards Police in Montenegro

In 2020, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro conducted a public perception survey on the attitudes of Montenegrin citizens towards the work of the Police Directorate. The survey focused on the citizens' views on the main threats to their security and safety and on their perception of the police as an institution and the overall police reform process. A report with the results of the survey was made publicly available for the information and benefit of national stakeholders and other organizations. The report included findings specifically on issues related to integrity of the police.¹⁷ The data was later used by the Mission to identify priority areas for project planning and for better shaping future actions. It is intended to conduct such perception surveys annually so that they can serve as a tool for both national stakeholders and the Mission to regularly measure progress in police reforms in Montenegro.

- **Support an integrity-building self-assessment of the security sector:** If there is sufficient interest from national stakeholders, the assessment by the OSCE could be combined with support to national stakeholders in undertaking a self-assessment. This can help promote ownership of identified programmatic areas for support and at the same time build capacity to address this issue and factor it into future risk analysis and risk management.



There are a number of tools for supporting self-assessments, for example:

- NATO (2009), *Building Integrity Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process*
- DCAF (2019), *Toolkit on Police Integrity* (chapter 9, section 3.1)

On the basis of the assessments, there are likely to be entry points for support spanning across areas such as the development of legal and policy frameworks, the promotion of integrity at the institutional level, developing knowledge tools and capacity-building support for security sector personnel, and the support to external oversight. The subsequent sections of the chapter encompass an overview of relevant examples under these categories.¹⁸

17 For additional details, see OSCE Mission to Montenegro, *Perception of the police in Montenegro: Results of a quantitative survey* (Podgorica, 2020).

18 Given that it is not possible to provide in-depth guidance on each area, the text rather highlights where detailed guidance exists to support the development of assistance in these areas.

Info Box 3



What Should Be Examined in Integrity-Building Assessments?

The scope of the assessment needs to be defined according to the specific context and the mandate received for the exercise. Through a combination of methodologies (e.g., desk research, stakeholder mapping, semi-structured interviews, surveys), assessments could aim, among others, at:

- ▶ Mapping applicable international and regional minimum standards on integrity. *Has the Government committed to any international or regional standards?*
- ▶ Mapping all relevant legislation and national and local policy frameworks covering integrity-related issues. *Are there laws setting minimum integrity standards for the public sector (or specifically for the security sector) at national and/or local levels? Are there national and/or local anti-corruption strategies and actions plans in place?*
- ▶ Identifying types and frequency of corruption and other undesirable practices being perpetrated by the security sector and its components (e.g., customs, traffic police). *Is there grand corruption (i.e., abuse of high-level power)? Is there petty corruption (i.e., everyday abuse of power by public officials in their interaction with citizens)? Is there a tendency to deviate the work of security sector institutions towards the interest of the few and away from the public interest (including by legitimate means)? If yes, what are existing practices?*
- ▶ Assessing the political economy and other informal institutional practices and networks which might impact the outcome of integrity-building efforts. *What are the power and economic relations within the security sector and between the sector and the structures overseeing it? Do these relations determine the type and the way corruptive practices are perpetrated?*
- ▶ Mapping causes for engaging in corruptive practices. *What are the incentives for the unethical behavior of security sector personnel (e.g., poor working conditions and salaries, lack of career perspectives)? Do security sector institutions have sufficient capacity and resources, human and financial, to successfully carry out their mandate? Is the structure of the institution found suitable to support a culture of integrity? Do security sector personnel have a good knowledge on the values and conduct expected within their tasks?*
- ▶ Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of existing internal accountability and external oversight mechanisms. *Have the security sector institutions developed codes of conduct or similar tools? Are those accessible to all staff? What are the sanctions in case of inappropriate behavior? Are internal and external accountability mechanisms in place and functional? Which are the institutions tasked with overseeing the level of (or lack of) integrity in the security sector? What is their mandate? Are those independent? How are they financed? How are their members elected?*
- ▶ Understanding local standards and assessing the level of awareness of the wider population. *What is the population's perception of the security sector's integrity? What are the needs? What are the opportunities to further strengthen security sector institutions' integrity? What are the values that citizens want security sector institutions and its personnel to observe in their conduct?*

4.2 Supporting Legal and Policy Frameworks

International, regional, national, local legal and policy frameworks provide entry points for building integrity in the security sector, especially by means of policies and regulations within security sector institutions. Support in this area can involve mapping legislative gaps, supporting legal and policy framework development in line with international standards, and supporting the practical application of these frameworks. While legal and policy frameworks related to integrity will differ from context to context, the following are some broad examples:

- **International conventions and other tools and commitments (including OSCE commitments) made by Governments** that include references to integrity and democratic governance of the public sector, and in particular, of the security sector. Some examples are the OSCE Decisions listed in the Figure 1, the UN Convention against Corruption, the World Customs Organization's Revised Arusha Declaration on Good Governance and Integrity in Customs Services, and the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions' declarations and guidelines on international professional standards for public sector auditing.¹⁹
- **National legislation** that builds on applicable international standards and sets a clear context-specific framework to support integrity building in the security sector (e.g., laws on civil service, anti-corruption laws, surveillance laws).
- **National strategies** include anti-corruption strategies and national security strategies, which are the two most relevant and common strategies in the area of integrity. Anti-corruption strategies should not only set minimum standards to be observed in the public sector but also explicitly mention the importance of these for the security sector. National security strategies should also explicitly mention integrity building as a prominent issue that affects the effective delivery of security.
- **National action plans** seeking the implementation of the commitments made in the aforementioned instruments. Enough human and financial resources should be allocated to that end, and accountability for their implementation should be sought, including by establishing clear M&E mechanisms.

19 For other intentional guidelines and standards, see DCAF's *website*.

Info Box 5

**Examples of Key Issues to Be Covered in National Normative Frameworks²⁰**

- ▶ Reference to international and regional instruments and already agreed standards. These could include anti-corruption conventions that have taken a broader approach to address prevention of corruption at the global level.
- ▶ Reflect human rights and gender-equality as key cross-cutting issues, which are fundamental to support integrity.
- ▶ Provide broad directions on the ways and means to achieve these standards, by encouraging, among others, the development of preventive measures, codes of conduct, provisions on conflict of interest, adequate capacity building, etc.
- ▶ Encourage setting up clear rules and secure procedures to empower and protect whistle-blowers reporting suspected cases of misconduct.
- ▶ Call for the establishment of adequate accountability and oversight mechanisms and appropriate procedures and sanctions to deal with misconduct.

20 List adapted from DCAF's websites on international standards and legal frameworks, and security sector legislation.

4.3 Promoting Integrity at the Institutional Level

Building integrity is not only about creating a framework but also about creating the right conditions at the institutional level. If staff are expected to be accountable to the institutions they represent, then these institutions should provide for clear and transparent processes to decision-making and management, including on recruitment. The institutions need to ensure decent working conditions for their staff, offer adequate remuneration, provide a safe working environment and manage risks.

All these processes are part of the internal accountability system that make the institutions more effective in delivering on their tasks. In these processes, it is encouraged to further explore and utilize digital tools to support strengthening integrity and internal accountability as appropriate.²¹ In this regard, OSCE staff could:

- **Develop risk analysis and risk management systems:** A system could be developed to systematically map sensitive processes (e.g., procurement, promotion of staff, inspection), sensitive functions (typically, staff with relevant decision-making powers related to finances, procurement, human resources, etc.) and identify vulnerabilities and risks to integrity violations. Control mechanisms (i.e., internal accountability systems) with investigation capacity to respond to suspicions of violations should also be put in place. Similarly, public surveys and other tools for the systematic collection of data on the population's perception regarding the level of integrity of the security sector could be developed. To support these types of early prevention efforts, the use of digital tools can become a great support, as they process and compare data more easily. Finally, to support increased transparency, the OSCE could encourage security institutions to make this data available to the public when appropriate.



For further information on risk assessments and management, see:

- OECD (2017), *Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity*
- INTOSAI (2019), *Guidelines for Internal Control in the Public Sector*
- DCAF (2019), *Toolkit on Police Integrity* (chapter 3, section 3.5)

21 OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision N.6/20 on Decision on Preventing and Combating Corruption through Digitalization and Increased Transparency* (Tirana, 2020).

Case Study 5



Supporting Risks Analysis on Corruption in Serbia

In 2019, the OSCE Mission to Serbia supported the Sector for Internal Control (SIC) of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia (MoI) to develop the Guidelines for Corruption Risk Analysis. The Guidelines were endorsed by the MoI as a part of the in-service training curriculum to be used by trainers from SIC and other organizational units of the MoI. In the course of 2020, the MoI appointed a number of working groups for each branch of the General Police Directorate (e.g., the SIC, traffic police, border police, specialized units, etc.) to conduct a corruption risk assessment for different types of posts within the police. In 2021, the Mission, together with DCAF's Police Programme, supported the MoI in training the working groups members on conducting such assessments. The training was delivered by experts from the National Anti-Corruption Agency of Serbia, Romanian Anticorruption General Directorate and the SIC. As the working groups are being established for different lines of work and there is rotation of the staff, there is a need for constant training on the subject.

- **Strengthen human resources management:** There is a need to ensure that the management of the security sector institutions' staff meets relevant international standards, such as clear and transparent assignment of authority and responsibility, appropriate lines of reporting, fair and transparent recruitment policies (including for the higher rank positions), merit-based systems to promotions, regular performance reviews, gender-equality policies, and the planning for post-service employment services. Cronyism and nepotism must be safeguarded against, and illicit practices (e.g., illicit enrichment) has to be prevented.²² Efforts should be made to meet international good practices in the development of professional standards through the consultation of staff. Labor unions should also play a role in ensuring respectable social and working conditions which are necessary preconditions for integrity.



For further information, see:

- DCAF (2019), *Toolkit on Police Integrity*, which includes useful insights on human resources and recruitment and which can serve as food for thought for other components of the security sector.
- DCAF (2015), *Training Manual on Police Integrity*, (chapters 2 and 3 on Human Resources Management and Integrity Planning)

22 In line with Art.20 of the UN Convention Against Corruption, applicable to all public officials and judicial office holders.

Case Study 6



Development of Human Resources Strategies for Increased Police Integrity in North Macedonia

In 2018, the Police Development Unit of the OSCE Mission to Skopje together with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) established joint working groups on human resources management and on disciplinary procedures. In 2019, the working groups produced a *Human Resources Management Strategy* (2020-2022) and a report on revised disciplinary procedures, respectively, with recommendations to be implemented in the upcoming three years. The working group on disciplinary procedures identified that many corruption cases were the result of poor recruitment practices and selection of individuals with low personal integrity. Furthermore, the ongoing practice of providing ethics training and traditional reactive investigations as a response to the complaints for police misconduct were found not to be sufficient to build a culture of integrity across the entire institution. In order to change this practice, more proactive investigations were recommended in addition to the provision of comprehensive ethics training.

Against this background, the working group outlined the following recommendations to strengthen police integrity:

- ▶ Introducing a disciplinary measure for not reporting peer misconduct;
- ▶ Establishing an early intervention (early prevention) system for employees with poor conduct;
- ▶ Establishing an automated case management system for recording disciplinary violations and disciplinary cases;
- ▶ Introducing a disciplinary matrix to specify the range of possible penalties and available aggravating and mitigating factors for each type of categorized misconduct;
- ▶ Providing more robust training for everyone involved in the entire disciplinary process (disciplinary commissions, internal control officers, etc.);
- ▶ Developing specific activities aimed at depoliticizing the members of the police forces and MoIA staff in order to ensure professional integrity and political neutrality;
- ▶ Developing a strong concept of professional integrity and policies in MoIA; and
- ▶ Assessing the risk of corruption and conflicts of interest.

In addition, the establishment of a sound mechanism for informing the public about issues concerning police competence and accountability was also foreseen. This was meant to send a clear and firm message to the public that cases of abuse of police power, as well as the inappropriate behavior and treatment by members of the MoIA, are to be resolved quickly and in full compliance with the relevant legal regulations.

- **Map and promote good practices in addressing incentives for misconduct and creating opportunities for strengthened integrity:** Salaries should be adequate and paid on time to avoid the need to look for other sources of income.²³ Implications for family members of security sector personnel should also be taken into consideration when deciding about the appropriateness of benefits, such as housing, schooling, medical care, etc. If the workplace provides for welfare, then it reduces the need for staff to engage in corrupt behaviors and provides incentives for them to perform their work competently, honestly and completely, according with the institution's ethical values.²⁴ Similarly, efforts should be made to identify existing vulnerabilities and incentives for malpractice and to support their elimination. For example, the number of resolved cases is not necessarily a good indicator of police officers' performance, as pressure to solve cases may, for instance, lead to the use of torture or ill-treatment to extract confessions. While issues like the height of salaries can usually not be influenced by the OSCE, efforts can be made to support national institutions to map opportunities for integrity, provide advice and facilitate the exchange of good practices. In identifying context-specific positive and negative incentives, relevant and adequately strong labor unions in the security sector are a key counterpart.
- **Strengthen financial management:** Non-transparent financial management in security sector institutions, lack of control over expenditures and the disconnection between policymaking, planning and budgeting are powerful enablers of corrupt practices, providing incentives to personnel not to perform their duties in accordance with the rules, guidelines and ethical values set by their institution.²⁵ Moreover, in the security sector, corruption can often occur in contracting and procurement, as relevant information is often confidential due to security reasons and may involve security restrictions on competition in tenders or limitations on subsequent audit and investigation. Thus, more attention should be paid to support participating States in establishing or enhancing appropriate financial management within security institutions, including by setting effective inspection and audit systems, clear and transparent procurement processes and appropriate mechanisms for income and asset declarations of public officials. All these processes can greatly benefit from digitalization.²⁶



For further information, refer to tools such as:

- OSCE (2016), *Handbook on Combating Corruption* (in particular chapters 7 and 8)
- World Bank (2017), *Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector*

23 To further explore the opportunities and limitations for economic incentives, consultations with the Ministry of Finances should be considered as appropriate.

24 United States Institute of Peace, *Fighting Corruption in Security Sector Reform* (Washington, D.C., 2010).

25 See also DCAF's website on *building integrity* and *resource management*.

26 In line with OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision N.6/20 on Decision on Preventing and Combating Corruption through Digitalization and Increased Transparency* (Tirana, 2020).

- **Promote institutional culture of integrity:** Efforts to build integrity at the institutional level should not be limited only to improving management practices and processes. The culture of an institution and overall working environment are equally important for any reform to succeed. The way how integrity-building efforts are framed and perceived within the institution concerned will influence attitudes of staff whose behavior and conduct are essential for achieving a long-term change. Promoting an institutional culture that endorses integrity as a key value can thus significantly contribute to the success of reform efforts in any other area, be it human resources, financial management, risk management or preventing misconduct.

4.4 Promoting Integrity at the Individual Level

To promote integrity within the security sector, personnel need to be provided with easily accessible tools that clearly define the shared ethical values that are expected from the institution they represent. Moreover, if staff is to be internally accountable for their actions, they should be capacitated with the ways and means to perform their duties in accordance with the set standards. To support efforts in this area, the OSCE staff could:

- **Support the development and review of codes of conduct (or similar tools) and provide regular training on such tools:** Codes of conduct offer important tools to guide the behavior of staff by setting expectations and requirements of professional conduct. They can cover areas such as conflicts of interest, declaration of offers/gifts, disclosure of assets, handling confidential information, abuse of office, etc. The codes should be easily accessible for all security personnel, firmly rooted in ethics and values, and appealing to read, with a simple layout, graphics and accessible (non-legalistic) text.²⁷ Nonetheless, while the formulation of their content is fundamental, they should also foresee mechanisms of implementation (e.g., provision of regular training, appointment of points of contact to provide further information when needed), sanctions for non-compliance and oversight arrangements.

27 Transparency International, *Building integrity and countering corruption in defence and security: 20 practical reforms* (London, 2011), p. 35.

Case Study 7



Building Integrity Training Capacity in Montenegro

At the request of the Ministry of Interior, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro has been co-supporting integrity-building initiatives for the police in partnership with DCAF's Police Integrity Building Programme since 2014. The first joint event organized was the Police Academy's "Strategic Planning Workshop on Police Integrity" conducted in late 2014. The event was followed by a seminar of national stakeholders, organized by DCAF in partnership with the Mission, to discuss the training required by the Ministry of Interior and an assessment of the Academy's priorities for external assistance. Participants were senior and mid-level staff members of the Police Academy, Ministry of Interior, Police Directorate, Police Internal Control Department and Legal and Human Resources Directorate, as well as representatives of the media and civil society.

Particular emphasis has been put on building in-service training capacity on integrity. In 2015, training was organized for police integrity facilitators and police gender facilitators. The aim was to create a small pool of trainers to strengthen police internal resources to independently conduct in-service training on gender and integrity for police officers. In 2017, similar training was again provided as a refresher component for those who were already trained in 2015. Later, the Mission conducted monitoring activities on the police in-service training conducted by the trained facilitators in different parts of the country. The feedback has been used to improve the training curricula for police officers and to develop more targeted training. Efforts were also made to combine in-person training with e-learning courses and to create an online learning platform. Additionally, to build support among police management on integrity, including the importance of the in-service training capacity, the Mission and DCAF conducted a workshop on integrity management and strategic planning for police managers in 2017.

Lessons learned:

- ▶ Building police capacity to provide in-service training in different parts of the country, and implementing parallel efforts to seek senior management support, was a successful strategy to ensure the sustainability and to promote national and local ownership.
- ▶ Carefully planning the selection of facilitators was very important as it helped identifying police officers with a certain level of authority and good reputation. These facilitators, who participated on a voluntary basis, upheld high levels of legitimacy when providing training to their colleagues.
- ▶ Creating a pool of trainers allowed the Police Directorate to provide training on integrity and gender in different parts of the country upon request.
- ▶ Planning for monitoring and evaluation activities to track progress and results of the in-service training provided by the trained facilitators enabled to improve and better target the Mission's efforts according to needs.

Info Box 6



Online Training Modules

- ▶ **OSCE course on Good Governance and Anti-Corruption:** In 2018, the OCEEA launched a number of online training modules (in English and Russian) on prevention and combating corruption for government officials, representatives of law enforcement, private sector and civil society on the [OSCE e-learning platform](#). The curricula of the modules, which include a specific module on integrity, is based on the [OSCE Handbook on Combating Corruption](#) and provides basic information on available tools and instruments to prevent and combat corruption. Although the modules aim at a wider audience, they can also be used as a part of anti-corruption awareness-raising activities within the security sector.
- ▶ **DCAF courses on Police Integrity:** These courses have been developed by DCAF under the framework of the Police Integrity Building Programme. They provide a clear understanding of police integrity, the factors that affect it and the key actors that can contribute to building and sustaining it (level 1 course). The courses also outline the opportunities to acquire knowledge around building, sustaining and strengthening organizational integrity (level 2 course). Both courses, as well as a facilitators' course, are available at [DCAF website](#).

- **Raise knowledge among staff on their rights and duties through the provision of training and development of awareness material:** It is important that security sector personnel are familiar with relevant legal norms and operational guidelines and understand the consequences for breaking the rules.²⁸ The provision of training and training-of-trainers programmes, as well as the development of promotional materials (brochures, leaflets, videos, etc.), can support raising the level of awareness of the staff of polices, laws, codes of conducts and any other regulatory frameworks on integrity. Awareness raising on integrity can be also integrated in the curricula of military, police and judicial academies, as well as online training modules. It is equally important to promote understanding of the opportunities and challenges in building integrity within the security sector among the leadership of the security sector institutions and policy makers. A more self-aware leadership can better support effective policy and integrity-building measures and be credible in convincing others about the reforms needed.²⁹



For further information, see:

- ▶ Transparency International (2016), *Building integrity and countering corruption in defence and security: 20 practical reforms (2nd edition)*
- ▶ OSCE (2016), *Handbook on Combating Corruption* (in particular chapters 5 and 6)

28 United States Institute of Peace, *Fighting Corruption in Security Sector Reform* (Washington, D.C., 2010).

29 Transparency International, *Building integrity and countering corruption in defence and security: 20 practical reforms* (London, 2011), pp. 22-ss.


Case Study 8



Promoting Gender Equality and Human Rights of Security Personnel in Kyrgyzstan

The Republican Committee of Soldiers' Mothers in Kyrgyzstan focuses on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of active-service personnel in military or para-military structures. This extends to issues such as combating ill- or degrading treatment; protecting personal and constitutional rights, including electoral rights; monitoring issues of nourishment and health; and providing psychological assistance. The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek is working with the Committee to raise awareness on these issues among those in active duty, as well as increasing the knowledge of active service personnel on their human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Similarly, in 2017, the OSCE supported the establishment of the Kyrgyz Association of Women in the Security Sector at a conference organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek in co-operation with the Kyrgyz Association of Women Police, Presidential Administration, Parliament, Defense Council, Supreme Court, Government, Prime Minister's Office, Ministry of Interior and all state security-providing structures. The association represents women who serve in the state's security sector and seeks to contribute to the common cause of promoting gender equality in the security sector of the country. Supporting gender equality, as well as promoting non-discrimination policies, have thus become strong entry points for the OSCE to build on key integrity values.



4.5 Strengthening External Oversight

External oversight mechanisms should be strengthened to ensure integrity frameworks are applied and to seek redress and compensation when those are violated. OSCE staff could:

- **Support strengthening state mechanisms:** State mechanisms depend on each particular context, but typically consist of anti-corruption agencies, ombuds institutions, parliamentarians and parliamentary committees, audit offices, the judiciary, the prosecutor's office, and other similar entities. Efforts should be made to develop strong, independent oversight mandates and capacities for these actors to enable the effective oversight of security sector institutions, including breaches of codes of conduct and other integrity frameworks. Support can be provided through assistance to establishing adequate mandates, including encouraging setting the conditions for financial independence, functional institutional processes, such as transparent recruitment processes and training on integrity-related issues. Finally, to support formal mechanisms for accountability, appropriate measures should be established to ensure that easily accessible complaints procedures and safe reporting channels are available to victims of misconduct by security personnel, whistleblowers, and other individuals with a legitimate interest in reporting the lack of integrity in the security sector. Efforts should be also made to raise awareness on existing complaint mechanisms among both citizens and security personnel (e.g., organizing information sessions, printing leaflets, disseminating further information on the internet and through other channels with the support of the media).
- **Support non-state oversight mechanisms:** Non-state actors include the civil society organizations, academic institutions, independent think tanks and the media. OSCE could strengthen the role and capacities of these actors to oversee security sector institutions, with a particular focus on civil society. Additionally, the OSCE could support the establishment of strong, independent, well-mandated, and respected labor unions for security sector staff as a key actor vis-à-vis the oversight of the human and financial management of security institutions. The OSCE could also organize joint workshops for journalists and press officers from the security sector institutions on media reporting on the security sector (e.g., on topics such as investigative journalism in the area of corruption, awareness-raising on freedom of information law or the freedom of assembly).



For further information on strengthening state and non-state external oversight mechanisms, see:

- OSCE (2016), *Handbook on Combating Corruption* (sections 12–15)
- DCAF (2021), *Toolkit for Security Sector Reporting: Media, Journalism and Security Sector Reform*

- **Support strengthening co-operation and co-ordination between anti-corruption agencies and other oversight bodies:** While a diverse set of oversight actors already exist in most OSCE participating States, specialized corruption prevention agencies and other oversight bodies are often scattered throughout all levels of government, and the overall system remains deeply fragmented and inefficient, sometimes resulting in conflicts over mandates and responsibilities. To strengthen a governance-driven approach, efforts could focus on promoting co-operation and co-ordination among anti-corruption agencies and oversight bodies, as well as between these and the security sector institutions themselves to support a coherent and effective accountability system.



For further information, see

- WFD (2020), *Combatting corruption capably: an assessment framework on parliament's interaction with anti-corruption agencies*

- **Support awareness-raising activities aimed at stimulating public debate on integrity-related issues within the security sector, and support sharing experiences and best practices at the regional level:** Considering that integrity is dependent on local, national and regional standards and political realities, and that political will is the driving vehicle for sustainable reforms, stimulating public debate and creating space for dialogue are key entry points for integrity-building programmes. For example, national and regional roundtables can provide a platform for stakeholders to reach a common understanding of the scope and importance of the security sector's integrity, including, when possible, reaching a consensus on the most significant priorities and challenges for strengthening integrity in the specific context.



5. Checklist

The following checklist is intended to help programme/project management staff to:

- Mainstream cross-dimensional approaches to integrity building in the security sector;
- Implement governance-driven support to integrity-building efforts;
- Facilitate the identification of entry points for programmatic support.

The purpose is not to “check” every item, but to provide an aide-memoire to consider key aspects and suggestions that might be relevant for your daily work.

Mainstreaming cross-dimensional approaches

To ensure programmatic support to integrity building, and benefit from the experience and expertise of the OSCE's three dimensions of security, the following considerations are encouraged:

Identify aspects of your integrity-building programme/project which might be of relevance to the other dimensions:

- ☐ If the programme/project aims at improving the integrity of the public sector, has the security sector been considered as a key part of the public sector?
- ☐ If the programme/project targets specifically security sector institutions, are there inputs and lessons learned by the second dimension that should be taken into account?
- ☐ Have elements of the rule of law, human rights and gender equality been fully integrated and mainstreamed?

Consider establishing mechanisms to support co-ordination of and co-operation on ongoing support:

- ☐ Would it be possible to set up a cross-dimensional working group to support information sharing and co-ordination on ongoing support to integrity-building efforts in the security sector?
- ☐ Alternatively, could integrity-building support be integrated into existing working groups focused on related or broader thematic areas?

If relevant, consider jointly planning a programme/project with other dimensions:

- ☐ Is there an opportunity to jointly plan a programme/project with other dimensions?
- ☐ Could other dimensions be considered a key partner for the implementation phase? For instance, other dimensions might have key expertise to be featured in trainings, conferences, technical meetings, etc.

At the very least, consider consulting with colleagues from other dimensions:

- ☐ When planning and developing a programme/project aiming at building integrity in the security sector, consult with other colleagues across the OSCE to identify synergies with other ongoing projects, and brainstorm on lessons learned and concerns that might be of relevance for the project design and implementation.

Providing governance-driven support to integrity building in the security sector

When planning and implementing projects/programmes related to integrity building in the security sector, beyond applying the good governance principles, the following three aspects should be considered:

Foster inclusive approaches when developing, implementing and overseeing integrity-building activities:

- ☐ Have all actors with a legitimate interest been identified and consulted (security sector institutions, audit offices, labor unions, parliamentary groups, civil society, other oversight institutions, etc.)?
- ☐ Have their considerations been properly featured into the project design?
- ☐ Will all relevant counterparts be engaged during the implementation phase? In what way?
- ☐ Have the concerns of and consequences for each gender been taken into consideration?

Prioritize support through an institution-building lens:

- ☐ Has the programme/project only considered enhancing individual capacity on integrity or is it also aiming at establishing the necessary institutional processes and mechanisms to promote change in management?
- ☐ If it is mainly focused on building individual capacities, are there opportunities to build synergies with other projects focused on institutional reform?
- ☐ If it is focused on building institutional capacities, has the time required for achieving sustainable change been factored in the programme/project design?
- ☐ Is the programme/project going beyond establishing a punitive framework and looking at building opportunities for integrity?

Promote a focus on both internal accountability and external oversight:

- ☐ How is internal accountability being addressed?
- ☐ Is accountability being sought at all levels of the security sector or are existing mechanisms only targeting the lower ranks?
- ☐ Is the project considering both state and non-state oversight mechanisms?
Do these mechanisms possess strong mandates for overseeing the integrity of security sector institutions?
- ☐ Do state and non-state oversight mechanisms have the necessary capacities for the successful implementation of their mandates?
- ☐ Even when a programme/project does not specifically focus on building internal accountability and/or external oversight for integrity, has the programme/project identified entry points for these areas?

Identifying key entry points for programmatic support

If there is the interest to further support building the integrity of security sector institutions, the following entry points for programmatic support can be considered by OSCE staff:

Assessing integrity-building needs

To identify priority areas for support and develop tailor-made integrity building initiatives that take into account the specific challenges, risks, needs and opportunities in building the integrity of security sector institutions, OSCE staff could:

- ☐ Introduce integrity aspects in broader SSG/R needs assessments;
- ☐ Conduct in-depth assessments of integrity building as a basis for developing a programme/project;
- ☐ Support an integrity-building self-assessment of security sector institutions.

When conducting needs assessments or supporting self-assessments, the following questions should be explored:

- ☐ What are the applicable international standards, legal and policy frameworks?
- ☐ What kind of corruptive activities are most commonly identified in the security sector?
- ☐ What accountability mechanisms are in place?
- ☐ What is the perception of the population?
- ☐ What are the needs in terms of integrity of the concerned security institutions?
- ☐ Why have these needs not been met to date?
- ☐ Have all relevant stakeholders been consulted?
- ☐ What are the risks and opportunities for integrity building in the security sector?
- ☐ What are the priorities for reform? At what level (institutional, individual, etc.)?

Supporting legal and policy frameworks

To support the development and review of legal and policy frameworks, assistance can be provided through the implementation of awareness-raising activities, and/or the provision of technical advice and support (e.g., on mapping legislative gaps, legal and policy framework development and practical application of these frameworks). In particular, OSCE staff could target the following levels:

- ☐ National legislation
- ☐ National and local anti-corruption, security and integrity strategies and policies
- ☐ National action plans

When supporting these frameworks, among other considerations, the following should be made:

- ☐ Are there references to international and regional instruments and other relevant standards?
- ☐ Is there a reference to human rights and gender equality as key elements of integrity?
- ☐ Are there clear directions on the ways and means to achieve integrity-building goals?
- ☐ Are there clear rules and procedures to empower and protect whistleblowers?
- ☐ Is there a clear mandate to establish adequate accountability and oversight mechanisms?

Promoting integrity at the institutional level

Clear and transparent processes to decision-making and management in security sector institutions should be established. To that end, OSCE staff could consider:

- ☐ Supporting the development of risks analysis and risk management systems;
- ☐ Providing technical advice to strengthen the human resources management;
- ☐ Mapping and promoting good practices in addressing incentives for misconduct and creating opportunities for strengthened integrity;

- ☐ Supporting an institutional culture and working environment that endorses integrity as a key value;
- ☐ Providing technical advice to strengthen the financial management.

Promoting integrity at the individual level

Security personnel need to be provided with the tools and capacities to perform their duties in accordance with the integrity standards set by the security institution they represent. To that end, OSCE staff could consider:

- ☐ Supporting the development and review of codes of conduct and similar tools;
- ☐ Raising knowledge among security sector staff on their rights and duties through training and development of awareness material;
- ☐ Promoting values and attitudes that contribute to building integrity.

Strengthening external oversight

External oversight mechanisms should be strengthened to ensure integrity frameworks are being applied and to seek redress and compensation when those are violated. To that end, the OSCE staff could support:

- ☐ Strengthening state oversight mechanisms through assistance to establishing strong and independent mandates, capacity-building, training;
- ☐ Enhancing capacities of non-state oversight mechanisms through capacity-building, training, etc.;
- ☐ Strengthening co-operation and co-ordination between anti-corruption agencies and between those and other oversight bodies;
- ☐ Awareness-raising activities to stimulate public debate on integrity-related issues within the security sector, and to support sharing experiences and best practices at regional level.



6. Resources

- ▶ Anderson, C. J. & Tverdova, Y.V., “Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(1), 2003, pp. 91-109.
- ▶ Clausen, B., Kraay, A., & Nyiri, Z., “Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions: Evidence from a Global Survey,” *The World Bank Economic Review*, 25(2), 2011, pp. 212-249.
- ▶ DCAF, *Toolkit for Security Sector Reporting: Media, Journalism and Security Sector Reform* (Geneva, 2021).
Available at: <https://www.dcaf.ch/toolkit-security-sector-reporting-media-journalism-and-security-sector-reform>.
- ▶ DCAF, *Toolkit on Police Integrity* (Geneva, 2019).
Available at: <https://www.dcaf.ch/toolkit-police-integrity>.
- ▶ DCAF, *Training Manual on Police Integrity* (Geneva, 2015).
Available at: https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_PIBP_Training%20Manual_ENG_2019_web_0.pdf.
- ▶ INTOSAI, *Guidelines for Internal Control Standards for the Public Sector* (Brussels, 2019).
Available at: <https://ms.hmb.gov.tr/uploads/sites/2/2019/09/INTOSAI.pdf>.
- ▶ NATO, *Building Integrity Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process* (Brussels, 2009).
Available at: <https://cids.no/wp-content/uploads/pdf/SAQ-English.pdf>.
- ▶ OECD, *OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity* (Paris, 2017).
Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/OECD-Recommendation-Public-Integrity.pdf>.
- ▶ OECD, *Preventing Policy Capture: Integrity in Public Decision Making* (Paris, 2017).
Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/gov/preventing-policy-capture-9789264065239-en.htm>.
- ▶ OSCE Ministerial Council, *Decision No. 4/16 on Strengthening Good Governance and Promoting Connectivity* (Hamburg, 2016).
Available at: <https://www.osce.org/cio/289316>.
- ▶ OSCE Mission to Montenegro, *Perception of the police in Montenegro: Results of a quantitative survey* (Podgorica, 2020).
Available at: <https://www.osce.org/mission-to-montenegro/475025>.
- ▶ OSCE, *Handbook on Combating Corruption* (Vienna, 2016).
Available at: <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/232761>.
- ▶ OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision No.6/20 on Preventing and Combating Corruption through Digitalization and Increased Transparency* (Tirana, 2020), MC.DEC/6/20.
Available at: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/7/479759.pdf>.
- ▶ OSCE, *Ministerial Council Declaration on Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism* (Dublin, 2012), MC.DOC/2/12.
Available at: <http://www.osce.org/cio/97968>.
- ▶ OSCE, *The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R): Report by the Secretary General of the OSCE* (Vienna, 2019).
Available at: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/a/414725.pdf>.
- ▶ Transparency International, *Building integrity and countering corruption in defence and security: 20 practical reforms* (London, 2011).
Available at: https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2009_HandbookBuildingIntegrity_EN.pdf.

- ▶ Transparency International, *Building integrity and countering corruption in defence and security: 20 practical reforms* (2nd edition) (London, 2016).
Available at: <https://ti-defence.org/publications/building-integrity-and-reducing-corruption-in-defence-security-20-practical-reforms/>.
- ▶ United States Institute of Peace, *Fighting Corruption in Security Sector Reform* (Washington, D.C., 2010).
Available at: <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Fighting-Corruption-in-Security-Sector-Reform>.
- ▶ WFD, *Combating corruption capably: an assessment framework on parliament's interaction with anti-corruption agencies* (London, 2020).
Available at: <https://www.wfd.org/what-we-do/resources/combating-corruption-capably-assessment-framework-parliaments-interaction>.
- ▶ World Bank, *Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector* (Washington, D.C., 2017).
Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25138>.

Websites

- ▶ DCAF Security Sector Integrity – Legislative Tools:
<https://securitysectorintegrity.com/bi-tools/legislative-tools/>
- ▶ DCAF Security Sector Integrity – Building Integrity Legal Framework & International Standards:
<https://securitysectorintegrity.com/standards-and-regulations/international-standards/>
- ▶ DCAF Security Sector Integrity – Building Integrity:
<https://securitysectorintegrity.com/building-integrity/>
- ▶ DCAF Security Sector Integrity – Security Sector Legislation:
<https://securitysectorintegrity.com/standards-and-regulations/security-sector-legislation/>
- ▶ DCAF Security Sector Integrity – Resource Management:
<https://securitysectorintegrity.com/defence-management/resource-management/>
- ▶ OSCE E-learning Platform:
<https://elearning.osce.org/>