Supporting Governance-Driven Approaches to Building Integrity in the Security Sector

As in all efforts to support the consolidation of democratic institutions, integrity-building programmes or programmes with an integrity component should look beyond the government and be developed in consultation with not only the security sector institution concerned but also civil society, relevant parliamentary groups and other relevant actors. Taking an inclusive approach will not only foster a common understanding of the challenges and possible solutions, and ensure that programmes are fit-for-purpose, but it will also improve the public perception and increase citizens’ trust in the security sector. Therefore, these actors should be involved at all stages of the project cycle to the extent possible.

Without establishing or changing necessary institutional processes and mechanisms, training individuals will not suffice, despite the fact that it is vital to foster change in knowledge and mindset. Integrity should thus be tackled from an institutional perspective and aim at decreasing incentives and opportunities for engaging in corruption and other undesirable practices. This should focus on organizational integrity by establishing clear and transparent human resources and financial management processes and creating decent working conditions for the police, military and other security actors with respect for gender equality and human rights. For institutional approaches to succeed, enough time should be planned to enable changes in behavior of staff that, in turn, will impact institutional practices and processes.

Integrity-building programmes in the security sector should strive to meet the same ethical standards of integrity as any other public institution. These values should be upheld through mechanisms of internal accountability which outline clearly what behavior is expected and how inappropriate behaviors sanctioned. At the same time, external oversight mechanisms are fundamental to ensure accountability at all levels of the security sector, including at the management level. External oversight mechanisms include state and non-state actors and institutions engaged in the democratic governance of the security sector (e.g., parliamentary committees, judicial services, anti-corruption agencies, independent complaint authorities, civil society, the media, etc.).

If SSG/R assessments are intended to examine the extent to which security sector institutions function in accordance with democratic norms and good governance principles, then assessing the status of integrity of the institutions can provide an important contribution to the overall exercise.

If integrity building has been identified as a key area for action, an in-depth assessment should be supported to identify specific needs and entry points. This requires gathering information on the applicable international and regional minimum standards, as well as on what constitutes low and high-levels of corruption in a given country and what are the perceptions by the local population.

If there is sufficient interest from national stakeholders, the assessment by the OSCE could be combined with support to national stakeholders in undertaking a self-assessment. This can help promote ownership of identified programmatic areas for support and at the same time build capacity to address this issue and factor it into future risk analysis and risk management.

A system could be developed to systematically map sensitive processes (e.g., procurement, promotion of staff, inspection), sensitive functions (typically, staff with relevant decision-making powers related to finances, procurement, human resources etc.) and identify vulnerabilities and risks to integrity violations. Control mechanisms with investigation capacity to respond to suspicions of violations should also be put in place. Similarly, public surveys and other tools for the systematic collection of data on the population’s perception regarding the level of integrity of the security sector could be developed.

There is a need to ensure that the management of the security sector institutions’ staff meets relevant international standards, such as clear and transparent assignment of authority and responsibility, appropriate lines of reporting, fair and transparent recruitment policies, merit-based systems to promotions, regular performance reviews, gender-equality policies, and the planning for post-service employment services. Cronyism and nepotism must be safeguarded against, and illicit practices has to be prevented. Labor unions should also play a role in ensuring respectable social and working conditions which are necessary preconditions for integrity.

Salaries should be adequate and paid on time to avoid the need to look for other sources of income. Implications for family members of security sector personnel should also be taken into consideration when deciding about the appropriateness of benefits, such as housing, schooling, medical care, etc. If the workplace provides for welfare, then it reduces the need for staff to engage in corrupt behaviors and provides incentives for them to perform their work competently, honestly and completely. Similarly, efforts should be made to identify existing vulnerabilities and incentives for malpractice and to support their elimination.

Non-transparent financial management in security sector institutions, lack of control over expenditures and the disconnection between policymaking, planning and budgeting are powerful enablers of corrupt practices. Moreover, in the security sector, corruption can often occur in contracting and procurement, as relevant information is often confidential due to security reasons and may involve security restrictions on competition in tenders or limitations on subsequent audit and investigation. Thus, more attention should be paid to support participating States in establishing or enhancing appropriate financial management within security institutions, including by setting effective inspection and audit systems, clear and transparent procurement processes and appropriate mechanisms for income and asset declarations of public officials.

The way how integrity-building efforts are framed and perceived within the institution concerned will influence attitudes of staff whose behavior and conduct are essential for achieving a long-term change. Promoting an institutional culture that endorses integrity as a key value can thus significantly contribute to the success of reform efforts in any other area, be it human resources, financial management, risk management or preventing misconduct.

Codes of conduct offer important tools to guide the behavior of staff by setting expectations and requirements of professional conduct. They can cover areas such as conflicts of interest, declaration of offers/gifts, disclosure of assets, handling confidential information, abuse of office, etc. The codes should be easily accessible for all security personnel, firmly rooted in ethics and values, and appealing to read. They should also foresee mechanisms of implementation, sanctions for non-compliance and oversight arrangements.

It is important that security sector personnel are familiar with relevant legal norms and operational guidelines and understand the consequences for breaking the rules. The provision of training and training-of-trainers programmes, as well as the development of promotional materials, can support raising the level of awareness of the staff. Awareness raising on integrity can be also integrated in the curricula of military, police and judicial academies, as well as online training modules. It is equally important to promote understanding of the opportunities and challenges in building integrity within the security sector among the leadership of the security sector institutions and policy makers.

State mechanisms typically consist of anti-corruption agencies, ombuds institutions, parliamentarians and parliamentary committees, audit offices, the judiciary, the prosecutor’s office, and other similar entities. Efforts should be made to develop strong, independent oversight mandates and capacities for these actors to enable the effective oversight of security sector institutions. Appropriate measures should be established to ensure that easily accessible complaints procedures and safe reporting channels are available to victims of misconduct by security personnel, whistleblowers, and other individuals with a legitimate interest in reporting the lack of integrity in the security sector. Efforts should be also made to raise awareness on existing complaint mechanisms among both citizens and security personnel.

Non-state actors include the civil society organizations, academic institutions, independent think tanks and the media. OSCE could strengthen the role and capacities of these actors to oversee security sector institutions, with a particular focus on civil society. Additionally, the OSCE could support the establishment of strong, independent, well-mandated, and respected labour unions for security sector staff. The OSCE could also organize joint workshops for journalists and press officers from the security sector institutions on media reporting on the security sector.

While a diverse set of oversight actors already exist in most OSCE participating States, specialized corruption prevention agencies and other oversight bodies are often scattered throughout all levels of government. To strengthen a governance-driven approach, efforts could focus on promoting co-operation and co-ordination among anti-corruption agencies and oversight bodies, as well as between these and the security sector institutions themselves to support a coherent and effective accountability system.

Stimulating public debate and creating space for dialogue are key entry points for integrity-building programmes. For example, national and regional roundtables can provide a platform for stakeholders to reach a common understanding of the scope and importance of the security sector’s integrity.